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COMMENT






Consider the following hypothetical.! ABC Corporation ("ABC
Corp.") is sued by employee A for alleged discrimination under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act2 ("the ADEA"). One year
later it is sued by former employee B for alleged gender discrimina-
tion under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act3 ('Title VII") in a separate
claim. ABC Corp. settles the ADEA claim with employee A under a
confidential settlement agreement that prohibits employee A from
disclosing the agreement to anyone but his immediate family and ac-
countant. The settlement agreement further provides that if employee
A breaches the confidentiality provision, ABC Corp. is entitled to
recoup the full settlement amount as well as attorney fees.
ABC Corp. has not settled employee B's Title VII claim and is in
the discovery stages of the litigation. Employee B's attorney plans to
call employee A as a witness at trial and seeks both discovery and
admission of the settlement agreement to show employee A's bias.
ABC Corp., however, is willing to stipulate to the existence of the
settlement agreement and argues that the confidential settlement
agreement between itself and a nonparty is therefore undiscoverable
and inadmissible. Moreover, ABC Corp. argues that even if the com-
promise agreement is discoverable and admissible, the settlement
amount must be redacted and excluded from trial.
I This hypothetical is drawn from the fact patterns of the cases discussed infra in Part II.
2 See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634(1990).
3 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1995).
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There is no mandatory Ohio law on point. But federal and other
state jurisdictions have addressed the issue, with varying approaches
and results. The purpose of this Comment, therefore, is to analyze
both the discoverability and admissibility of a confidential settlement
agreement amount from the perspective of a litigant seeking to pre-
serve confidentiality. It examines Ohio discovery and evidence rules
and their policies. Based on the Ohio rules and the analogous federal
rules, this Comment also suggests the proper way in which Ohio ap-
pellate courts should approach the problem. Specifically, Ohio courts
should not allow discovery of confidential settlement agreement
amounts between a defendant and a nonparty unless the moving party
meets a heightened relevancy standard. Moreover, even if the mov-
ing party satisfies this heightened burden and is able to discover the
settlement amount, Ohio courts should seldom allow the jury to be
told the settlement amount under Ohio Rule of Evidence 403 because
of the substantial prejudice to the defendant in doing so.
This Comment addresses the legal issues in three sections. Part I
briefly summarizes evidence and civil procedure rules that are in-
volved in the discovery and admission of confidential settlement
agreements in general. Part II analyzes possible legal arguments both
for and against discovery and admission of confidential compromise
agreements, including witness bias, trial preparation and strategy, and
evidence rule policy arguments, as they relate to confidential settle-
ment amounts. Part II also discusses the possible relevancy standards,
normal and heightened, that Ohio courts can use to determine discov-
erabiity. Finally, Part I proposes that because of the privacy inter-
ests involved and the importance of fostering settlements, Ohio courts
should use a heightened relevancy standard to determine if confiden-
tial settlement agreement amounts are discoverable. Further, Part IIJ
suggests that Ohio courts should defer to the policy of Ohio Rule of
Evidence 408 and diligently use an Ohio Rule of Evidence 403 bal-
ancing approach for admissibility of such amounts. This approach
would almost always prevent the jury from hearing the settlement
amount. Part III concludes with an application of the discovery and
admissibility standards to the ABC Corp. hypothetical.
I. BACKGROUND: RULES OF DISCOVERABILITY AND ADMISSIBILITY
OF CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
Most Ohio common pleas courts, appellate courts, the Ohio Su-
preme Court, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit have not
yet addressed whether confidential settlement agreements are discov-
erable. At least one Ohio common pleas court, however, has held that
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settlement agreements are discoverable if they are relevant.4 This ac-
cords with the general Ohio discovery rules that permit discovery of
any matter relevant to the subject matter that is not privileged.
Specifically, Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 26(B) provides that:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action .... It is not grounds for objection that
the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to
discovery of admissible evidence. 5
Therefore, confidential settlement agreements, in general, appear
to be discoverable in Ohio if they are relevant. As in Ohio, the dis-
coverability of confidential compromise agreements in federal and
most state jurisdictions also hinges upon the relevancy of the settle-
ment agreement. A minority of jurisdictions, however, has implied
that there is privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 408 ("Federal
Rule 408") that protects all settlement communications, including
final agreements, from discovery. Federal Rule 408 limits the intro-
duction at trial of settlement evidence, but does not directly govern
discovery. Specifically, Federal Rule 408 provides:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to
furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a
valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to
compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity
or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity
of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or state-
ments made in compromise negotiations is likewise not ad-
missible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evi-
dence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented
in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does
not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for an-
other purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness,
negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort
6-to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
4 See Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 660 N.E. 2d 765 (Ohio
Ct. Com. P1. 1993) (holding that a settlement agreement in an asbestos action was discoverable
because it was relevant to show that lower levels of insurance had been exhausted).
5 OH. R. Civ. P. 26(B).
6 FED. R. EvID. 408. Ohio Rule 408 is substantively identical to Federal Rule 408. See
OH. RL EvID. 408.
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Many courts have noted, however, that the policy underlying
Federal Rule 408 to encourage settlement agreements may impact the
discoverability of settlement agreements. 7 In addition to merely not-
ing that Federal Rule 408 policy impacts discovery, some courts have
partly relied on Federal Rule 408 policy in prohibiting discovery of
settlement agreements. Specifically, these courts emphasize the
strong Federal Rule 408 policy interest in encouraging settlements,
opining that a settlement communication privilege is necessary to ef-
fectuate Federal Rule 408's purpose of encouraging settlements.8 But
many federal and state jurisdictions reject the view that Federal Rule
408 creates an absolute privilege for all settlement communications.
9
One argument given by these courts and others in rejecting the Fed-
eral Rule 408 privilege theory is that historically privileges such as
those between lawyer and client and husband and wife were created
to foster these important societal relationships. Parties to settlement,
however, have an adversarial relationship that society arguably has no
interest in fostering. t Additionally, Federal Rule 408, by its express
terms, appears to only apply at trial and Federal Rule 408 only pro-
tects against admission of settlement evidence used to prove the
validity of a claim."
7 See Allen County v. Reilly Indus., 197 F.R.D. 352, 353 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (applying
Federal Rule 408 policy to discovery); Young v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 169 F.R.D.
72, 76-79 (S.D. W. Va. 1996) (noting that many federal courts require the requesting party to
meet a heightened standard in deference to Federal Rule 408 when considering the discoverabil-
ity of confidential settlement agreements); Vardon Golf Co., Inc. v. BBMG Golf Ltd., 156
F.R.D. 641, 650-51 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (extending Federal Rule 408 policy to discovery); Lesal
Interiors, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 153 F.R.D. 552, 562 (D.N.J. 1994) (same); Fidelity
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Felicetti, 148 F.R.D. 532, 534 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (applying the height-
ened standard in deference to Federal Rule 408); Morse/Diesel, Inc.v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Md., 122 F.R.D. 447,451 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same).
8 See Kennon v. Slipstreamer, Inc., 794 F.2d 1067, 1071 (5th Cir. 1986) (denying discov-
ery partly on Federal Rule 408 policy grounds); McHann v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 713
F.2d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1983) (denying discovery and opining that "the incentive for parties to
settle cases involving many plaintiffs would be undermined if their settlement with one victim
could come back to haunt them in later suits."); Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Housing Servs.,
187 F.R.D. 453, 458-62 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (prohibiting discovery of confidential settlement
agreement because of strong public interest in encouraging settlements); Bottaro v. Hatton As-
socs., 96 F.R.D. 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). See also Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 603 F. Supp.
445, 449-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that a settlement privilege exists which prohibits discov-
ery of settlement communications absent a clear showing that Federal Rule 408 would not pro-
hibit admission of the settlement evidence at a subsequent trial); Dunlop v. Bd. of Governors, 16
F.E.P. Cases 1116, 1117 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (opining that settlement communications privilege is
necessary to effectuate Federal Rule 408's purpose of encouraging settlements).
9 See Bennett v. La Pere, 112 F.R.D. 136 (D.R.I. 1986); NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, Inc. v. Dept. Of Justice, 612 F. Supp. 1143 (D.D.C. 1985); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Dept.
of Justice, 576 F. Supp. 739 (D.D.C. 1983).
10 See Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 955, 990 (1988) for a detailed discussion of this argument.
11 See id. for a detailed discussion of these arguments.
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Federal circuit courts addressing the discoverability of confiden-
tial settlement agreements have followed Federal discovery rules
12
and held that confidential settlement agreements are only discover-
able if they are relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to discovery
of admissible evidence. These courts have found witness impeach-
ment and damage issues to be permissible relevant purposes. 13 These
same courts are split, however, as to the showing of relevance re-
quired to justify the disclosure of a settlement agreement. Some re-
quire a "particularized showing" that disclosure of settlement agree-
ments will lead to admissible evidence; others reject the heightened
standard and only require the normal relevancy standard.
14
State courts15 have also held that confidential settlement agree-
ments are discoverable only if they are relevant. 16 The discoverability
12 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) which provides:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action...
. The information sought need not be admissible at the trial if the infor-
mation sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of ad-
missible evidence.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (b).
13 See Young v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 169 F.R.D. 72,79 (S.D. W. Va. 1996)
(holding compromise agreement between client and insurance company that resulted from an
unlawful trade practices suit was discoverable in an action by the client's former attorney for
fees because it was relevant to the nature of the agreement between client and attorney, and the
results obtained in the action); Baby Doe v. Methacton Sch. Dist., 164 F.R.D. 175, 177 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (holding that confidential settlement agreements may be discoverable on a heightened
showing that discoverability will lead to admissible evidence but finding no such showing in
this case); Vardon Golf Co., Inc. v. BBMG Golf Ltd., 156 F.R.D. 641 (N.D. IM. 1994); Lesal
Interiors, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 153 F.RtD. 552, 562 (D.N.J. 1994) (recognizing dis-
coverability of settlement agreements but declining to compel disclosure where party seeking it
did not make a particularized showing that material sought was relevant or likely to lead to
admissible evidence); Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 122 F.R.D. 447, 451
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that a settlement agreement was discoverable because it was relevant
to the requesting party's increased remuneration claim and the requesting party had documented
specific instances in which the settlement documents showed increases in construction costs);
Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 603 F. Supp. 445,449-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that where
there was no evidence that confidential compromise agreement was relevant to show witness
bias, discovery of the terms of the agreement should be denied to safeguard policy favoring
settlements); Bottaro v. Hatton Assocs., 96 F.R.D. 158, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that a
confidential settlement agreement was not discoverable because "the terms of the settlement do
not appear to be reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence.").
14 See infra Part IIA3 for a more detailed discussion of the different relevance standards
used by the courts.
Is Since the Ohio rules of evidence and civil procedure at issue here are substantively
analogous to the Federal rule, state cases addressing the discoverability of confidential settle-
ment agreements are instructive.
16 See Hinshaw v. Superior Ct. of Santa Clara County, 51 Cal. App. 4th 233, 242 (Ct.
App. 1996) (holding that because the settlement terms were irrelevant to the action, public pol-
icy favored settlements, and the parties to the settlement expressed a desire for confidentiality,
the confidential settlement agreements were not discoverable); Porter-Hayden Co. v. Bullinger,
713 A.2d 962, 969 (Md. 1998) (holding that settlement agreement in joint-tortfeasor action was
discoverable because the settlement amounts were relevant to damages); Hulse v. A.B. Dick
Co., 162 Misc. 2d 263 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (overruled on other grounds); Burlington Northern,
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of settlement agreements in federal and state jurisdictions, therefore,
turns on the relevancy of the settlement agreement. Both the Ohio
and Federal Rules of Evidence define relevant evidence as "evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of con-
sequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence."'17
Under Ohio law, evidence of settlements is inadmissible to prove
liability, the invalidity of a claim, or the amount of a claim.' 8  Simi-
larly, Federal Rule 408 prohibits the admission of compromises or
offers of compromise "to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim
or its amount."'19 Under both Ohio and federal law, the rule also ap-
plies to evidence of a settlement between a party and a non-party.20
While Ohio Rule of Evidence 408 ("Ohio Rule 408") bars admission
of settlement evidence to prove liability or validity of a claim, it ex-
pressly allows such evidence to be admitted for other purposes.2 '
Federal Rule 408 also permits settlement evidence to be admitted for
Inc., v. Hyde, 799 S.W. 2d 477 (Tex. App. 1990) (holding that settlement agreement was dis-
coverable for admissible evidence, but not the amount); Palo Duro Pipeline Co., Inc. v. Coch-
ran, 785 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tex. App. 1990) (holding that a compromise agreement is not dis-
coverable where the parties' interest in the cash amount of the settlement is as a 'comparative
bargaining tool for their settlement purpose' because this interest does not satisfy the relevance
test for discovery).
17 FED. R. EvID. 401; OH. R. EVID. 401.
'8 OH. R. EVID. 408. Specifically, Ohio Rule 408 states:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2)
accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in
compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed
as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or
invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements
made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule
does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable
merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations.
This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for
another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativ-
ing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a crimi-
nal investigation or prosecution.
Id.
19 FED. R. EviD. 408.
20 See McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 247 (Ist Cir. 1985); Lewis v. Alfa Laval
Separation, Inc., 714 N.E.2d 426, 432 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. BPS
Co., 491 N.E.2d 365 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).
21 See OH. R. EVID. 408; see also Lewis, 714 N.E.2d at 432 (holding that admission of
settlement between the plaintiff and a nonparty was proper because the settlement was offered
to explain why evidence was unavailable to the plaintiff's expert, why the nonparty was not a
party to the case, and to explain the nonparty's lack of motivation to be forthright about the
investigation it conducted); Shimola v. Cleveland, 625 N.E.2d 626, 630 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that testimony regarding settlement properly admitted in property action where the
settlement testimony was offered to outline the history of the disputed property's move to its
new location); Owens Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 660 N.E.2d 828,
831 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1995) (admitting settlement between plaintiff and settling defendants in
an asbestos suit because it was offered so jurors would understand the scope of the plaintiff's
insurance coverage and not to prove liability).
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purposes other than proving liability or validity of a claim.22 There-
fore, under both Ohio and federal law, admissibility of settlement
evidence hinges upon the purpose of admission. Part II analyzes pos-
sible admission arguments for confidential settlement agreement
amounts under both Ohio and federal law.
II. LEGAL ARGUMENTS FOR POSSIBLE DISCOVERY AND ADMISSION
OF CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AMOUNTS
A. Discovery of Confidential Settlement Agreement Amounts
As discussed in Part I, there is no mandatory Ohio law about the
discoverability of confidential settlement amounts between a party
and a nonparty. Under persuasive Ohio law and analogous Federal
Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure, confidential settlement
agreements in general are discoverable only where they are relevant.
Therefore, the following sections analyze possible relevancy argu-
ments for and against discovery of a confidential settlement agree-
ment amount between a defendant and a nonparty.
1. Relevancy of Confidential Settlement Agreements to Show Witness
Bias
Many courts have held that confidential settlement agreements
are relevant for impeachment purposes.23 Therefore, one of the
strongest arguments for discovery of confidential settlement agree-
ment amounts in Ohio is that the settlement is relevant to show wit-
ness bias. In a Sixth Circuit case, Allen County v. Reilly Industries,
24
the court addressed the discoverability of the content of settlement
negotiations.2 The court held that settlement negotiation letters were
not discoverable because they were not relevant to the existence of
witness bias since the plaintiff had already turned over the final set-
tlement agreement to the defendants.26 Significantly, the court stated,
"[the settlement] agreement-and not the unaccepted proposals-
22 See United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Olympia Wings, Inc., 896 F.2d 949,
956 (5th Cir. 1990) (admitting settlement evidence where it was offered to show the change in
witness's position since his deposition); Mclnnis, 765 F.2d at 248; Breuer Elec. Mfg. Co. v.
Toronado Sys. of Am., 687 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1982).
23 See John McShain, Inc.v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 563 F.2d 632 (3rd Cir. 1977) (holding
that settlement evidence is relevant to witness's credibility); Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Hous-
ing Servs., 187 F.R.D. 453, 461 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that fact of settlement is relevant to
impeach plaintiff as a chronic litigator). See also Allen County v. Reilly Indus., 197 F.R.D.
352, 354 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (noting that settlement agreements are relevant to show witness
bias).
b) 197 F.R.D. 352 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
2 See id
26 See id at 353-54.
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would best satisfy Reilly's needs to the extent it seeks to establish a
bias.27
Because the Allen County court expressly noted that the settle-
ment agreement would best show witness bias, a party seeking dis-
covery of a confidential settlement amount in Ohio can argue that the
Allen County decision supports the proposition that final settlement
agreements are always discoverable to show witness bias. It should
be noted, however, that since Allen County was a Sixth Circuit federal
case that addressed the discoverability of settlement negotiation evi-
dence and the discovery of the settlement agreement itself was not in
dispute, it is unclear the effect that Allen County will have on Ohio
state law. Further, Ohio litigants seeking to protect the confidentiality
of the settlement amount may be able to distinguish Allen County.
First, the Allen County court did not have to decide if the settlement
agreement was discoverable because it appears that the plaintiff vol-
untarily disclosed it. Therefore, Allen County arguably did not advo-
cate a blanket discoverability of settlement agreements. Next, there is
no indication that the Allen County settlement agreement was confi-
dential. Finally, the settling co-defendant in Allen County was testify-
ing at trial. Therefore, a party arguably could distinguish Allen
County if it successfully motioned to exclude the settling nonparty's
testimony at trial.
Additionally, many courts, while allowing discovery of the exis-
tence of settlement agreements for impeachment purposes, have pro-
hibited discovery of the specific terms and amount of the settlement
because the existence of the settlement agreement alone, is all that is
necessary to impeach witnesses. 28 Moreover, at least one court has
disallowed discovery of the confidential settlement amount on the
basis that "allowing discovery of the consideration being paid in con-
fidential settlements of this kind would have a chilling effect on their
encouragement." 29 Therefore, even if the settling nonparty was testi-
fying at trial as a witness, a defendant might still be able to prevent
discovery of the settlement amount based on the policy favoring set-
tlements expressed in the above line of cases. Moreover, if the de-
27 Id.
28 See Hasbrouck, 187 F.R.D. at 461 (holding that discovery of the details of the settle-
ment agreement not necessary to impeach a witness because the fact of the settlement alone was
sufficient to impeach); Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 367 (D.C. Nev. 1993) (holding
that although the factual information surrounding a settlement agreement was discoverable, the
amount and conditions of the agreement were not discoverable absent a showing of compelling
need); Hulse v. A.B. Dick Co., 162 Misc. 2d 263, 267 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (holding that disclo-
sure of the terms and amount of the settlement was unnecessary for impeachment because "it is
the merefact that there was a settlement... that may, in the eyes of the jury, taint a witness's
credibility").
29 Burlington Northern, Inc., v. Hyde, 799 S.W. 2d 477,481 (Tex. App. 1990).
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fendant were willing to stipulate to the existence of the settlement, it
would arguably have a stronger argument that the settlement is not
discoverable at all and that at the very least, the settlement amount is
not discoverable.
2. Use of Confidential Settlement Agreement Amounts as Trial
Strategy
Another argument that a party seeking discovery of a cash settle-
ment amount may advance is that the settlement agreement and
amount are relevant to trial strategy and preparation. At least two fed-
eral courts have allowed discovery of the terms and amounts of confi-
dential settlement agreements, opining that they are relevant to trial
strategy and preparation.30 In Bennett v. LaPere,31 a medical malprac-
tice action, the court permitted discovery of a confidential settlement
agreement that was relevant to proving damages under a state tort
damages act.32 The court, however, emphasized that the relevance of
the settlement was not limited to proving damages.33 Rather, it held
that discovery of the settlement was also relevant to the defendant's
determination of whether it could introduce the settlement at trial
without violating Federal Rule 408.34 The court further stated that the
remaining defendant's "ability realistically to evaluate the plaintiff's
case against it depends upon an awareness of the terms and conditions
of the settlement with the codefendants ... the remaining defendants
should not be left to grope blindly in the dark.,
35
Many other courts, however, have rejected this argument, reason-
ing that it does not satisfy the discovery relevancy standard.36 In Baby
Doe v. Methacton School District,37 for example, the defendant
30 See Bennett v. LaPere, 112 F.R.D. 136, 141 (D.R.I. 1986); EnergyNorth Natural Gas,
Inc. v. Century Indemnity Co., No. 97-64-M, 2000 WL 33667085, at *1 (D.N.H. March, 8
2000) (unpublished order) (holding that a desire to keep prior settlement agreement amounts
confidential is not a valid reason for opposing disclosure because full disclosure will facilitate
the settlement process). It should be noted that it is unclear whether the EnergyNorth Natural
Gas, Inc. settlement agreement contained a confidentiality provision or if the parties merely
wished the agreement to remain secret. Therefore, the full impact of the EnergyNorth Natural
Gas, Inc. decision in assessing the discoverability of a confidential settlement agreement
amount is unknown.
31 112F.R.D. 136 (D.R.I. 1986).
32 See id. at 138.
33 See id. at 139.
34 See id.35 See id. at 141.
36 See Baby Doe v. Methacton Sdh. Dist., 164 F.R.D. 175, 176-77 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (reject-
ing the trial preparation relevancy argument); Hulse v. A.B. Dick Co., 162 Misc. 2d 263, 265
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (same); Palo Duro Pipeline Co., Inc. v. Cochran, 785 S.W.2d 455, 457
(Tex. App. 1990) (holding that non-settling party's interest in cash amount of settlement agree-
ment as a "comparative bargaining tool" does not satisfy the relevancy test for discovery); Bur-
lington Northern, Inc., v. Hyde, 799 S.W. 2d 477,481 (Tex. App. 1990) (same).
37 164 F.R.D. 175 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
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sought discovery of the plaintiff s confidential settlement agreement
with two co-defendants. The defendant alleged that the agreement
was relevant for three reasons: 1) it could lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence; 2) it was relevant to the issue of damages; and
3) it was necessary for trial preparation. 39 The court denied the defen-
dant's discovery request, holding that the defendant had not shown
the relevance of the agreement, reasoning that "the broad assertion
that the [agreement] could lead to admissible evidence and that it is
'clearly' relevant to. . . damages and is imperative for trial prepara-
tion ... without any detail or analysis whatsoever, are insufficient to
prove... relevance."
4
In Hulse v. A.B. Dick Co.,41 plaintiffs in a repetitive stress injury
action sought a protective order against the non-settling defendants'
discovery request for the plaintiffs compromise agreement with the
settling defendants. 42 The applicable New York discovery rule pro-
vided that "discovery is limited to what is 'material and necessary in
the prosecution or defense of an action' and entails liberal disclosure,
upon request, 'of any facts bearing on the controversy which will as-
sist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay
and prolixity."' 43 The non-settling defendants argued that the settle-
ment was material and necessary to determine their maximum dam-
age exposure at trial and to determine if they should settle the plain-
tiff's claim or continue to defend.44 The court, however, rejected this
trial strategy argument, reasoning that:
[a]lthough trial strategy is important to any party in litigation,
defendants' 'need' to obtain the settlement information arises
not out of materiality or necessity but, rather, desirability. As
much as defendants believe that obtaining this information
now will better protect them at the time of trial, or assist them
in assessing their risk of trial versus settlement, these are nei-
ther recognized nor accepted reasons for denying plaintiff's
motion and disclosing the terms of the settlement agree-
ments.45
In Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Hyde,46 defendants in an oil and
gas lease dispute sought a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court
38 See id. at 175.
39 See id. at 176.
40 Id. at 176-77.
41 162 Misc. 2d 263 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994).
42 Id. at 264.
43 Id. at 264-65 (citation omitted).
44 See id. at 265.
45 Id.
46 799 S.W.2d 477 (Tx. App. 1990).
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to rescind its order requiring disclosure of the confidential settlement
agreement amount between the defendants and a cross-claiming
party.47 Under Texas discovery rules, the existence and contents of
compromise deals that are "relevant to the subject matter in the pend-
ing action" were discoverable. 48 The defendants argued that the set-
tlement amount was irrelevant to any issues remaining in the lawsuit
with the non-settling parties.49 The non-settling party, however, as-
serted that the amount was both relevant and reasonably calculated to
lead to discoverable evidence.5 0 The court granted the writ of man-
damus holding that the settlement amount was not relevant to the re-
maining cause of action. 51 The court reasoned that the litigant merely
wanted the agreement for trial strategy purposes and noted that for a
settlement amount to be discoverable, there must be "some relevance
other than as a 'comparative bargaining tool.' ' 52 Therefore, based on
this line of cases, an Ohio party opposing discovery of a confidential
settlement amount has a strong argument that the cash amount is ir-
relevant as anything other than an impermissible bargaining tool and
is undiscoverable.
3. Different Relevancy Standards Used by the Courts
Ohio parties opposing discovery of confidential settlement
agreements can argue that Ohio courts should use a heightened rele-
vancy standard. As briefly discussed in Part I, federal circuit courts
addressing the discoverability of confidential settlement agreements
have split on the showing of relevance required to justify the disclo-
sure of a settlement agreement. Some courts have emphasized the
litigant's privacy interest over the broad discovery policy and have
required a "particularized showing" that disclosure of settlement
agreements will lead to admissible evidence.53 In Bottaro v. Hatton
Associates,54 a securities action, the court rejected a defendant corpo-
ration's discovery request for a former co-defendant's settlement
agreement with the plaintiffs because the settlement amount was not
47 See id. at 478-79.




52 Ia (quoting Palo Duro Pipeline Co., Inc. v. Cochran, 785 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tex. App.
1990)).
53 See, e.g., Lesal Interiors, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 153 F.R.D. 552, 562 (D.NlJ.
1994) (requiring a "greater, more 'particularized showing' that the [settlement] evidence sought
is relevant and calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence"); Morse/Diesel, Inc.v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co., 122 F.RD. 447,450-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (requiring more particularized
showing of relevancy for discovery of confidential settlement agreements).
- 96 F.R.D. 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
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relevant.55 The court applied a "particularized showing" heightened
relevancy standard, reasoning that:
The question in this case... is whether an inquisitor should
get discovery into the terms of the [settlement] agreement it-
self based solely on the hope that it will somehow lead to
admissible evidence on the question of damages. Given the
strong public policy of favoring settlements and the congres-
sional intent to further that policy by insulating the bargain-
ing table from unnecessary intrusions, we think the better
rule is to require some particularized showing of a likelihood
that admissible evidence will be generated by the dissemina-
tion of the terms of a settlement agreement.
56
The court in Lesal Interiors, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp.57 ech-
oed this emphasis on the settlement policy when it applied a height-
ened relevancy standard and rejected a discovery request for a confi-
dential settlement amount.58 The court elaborated on the conflict be-
tween the policy favoring settlements and the policy favoring broad
discovery, noting that in regards to the appropriate standard to be
used in the discovery of settlement negotiations:
[A]s Judge Joyner noted, "the principles underlying Fed. R.
Evid. 408 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 are in conflict." This court
agrees, and observes that while Congress' intent in Civil
Rule 26 . . . was an acknowledgment that the "mutual
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties
is essential to proper litigation," it was equally affirmative
in its desire, reflected in Rule of Evidence 408, to observe
"the strong public interest in encouraging settlement of pri-
vate litigation." It is not reasonable to suggest that Con-
gress intended to denigrate one rule through the application
of the other rule, therefore the two must somehow find rec-
onciliation. It is the belief of this court that the most rea-
sonable means of doing this, and one which best effectuates
the aims of both rules, is to require a greater, more "particu-
larized showing" that the evidence sought is relevant and
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.5 9
55 See id at 159-160.
56 Id. at 160.
57 153 F.R.D. 552 (D.NJ. 1994).
58 See id. at 561-62.
59 Id.
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Others courts, however, emphasize the policy favoring broad dis-
covery and reject the heightened standard in favor of the normal rele-
vancy standard.60 The Bennett court, for example, expressly rejected
the Bottaro court's reasoning, stating:
With respect [to Bottaro] . . . the balance which Bottaro
suggests seems out of kilter with the spirit and philosophy
of the Federal Rules. . . . [IT]he underpinnings of Bottaro
simply will not support the weight of its reasoning.... Rule
[408] addresses the admissibility of compromise negotia-
tions... the Rule cannot be read so broadly as to bar dis-
covery in the same sweeping fashion... . Bottaro [also]
misconceives the public policy considerations which under-
lie Rule 408.... the fears which might inhibit the making
of offers in the absence of Rule 408 do not apply [when a
settlement is achieved].6 '
4. Obtaining Relevant Information Through Means Other Than
Discovery of Settlement Agreements
Even where a confidential settlement agreement is relevant, a de-
fendant may still be able to protect the secrecy of the amount if the
relevant information in the settlement agreement is available through
other means. Courts have denied settlement agreement discovery re-
quests when the requesting party fails to show that he cannot obtain
the relevant information through other means. 62 In Butta-Brinkman v.
FCA International, Inc.,63 a sexual harassment plaintiff sought dis-
covery of documentation relating to other allegations of harassment
against the defendant, including the defendant's confidential corn-
60 See, e.g., Young v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 169 F.R.D. 72, 79 (S.D. W. Va.
1996) (noting that if the party requesting discovery of confidential settlement documentation
shows that the 'information appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissi-
ble evidence,' then it is probably discoverable"); Baby Doe v. Methacton Sch. Dist., 164 F.R.D.
175, 176-77 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (discussing the different relevancy standards used but appearing to
use the normal relevancy standard when it denied disclosure of confidential settlement agree-
ment because the requesting party had made no "showing that the Release is 'relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action"'); Bennett v. LaPere, 112 F.R.D. 136, 139-40 (D.
RI. 1986) (rejecting the argument that the party requesting discovery of confidential settlement
agreements has "the burden of making 'some particularized showing of a likelihood that admis-
sible evidence will be generated by the dissemination of the terms of a settlement agreement."
(quoting Bottaro, 96 F.R.D. at 160)).
61 Bennett, 112 F.R.D. at 139-40.
62 See Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Housing Servs., 187 F.R.D. 453, 461 (N.D.N.Y. 1999)
(denying discovery of settlement agreement where the evidence was available through other
means); Butta-Brinkman v. FCA Intl., Inc., 164 F.R.D. 475 (N.D. M. 1995); Flynn v. Portland
Gen. Elec. Corp., [1989] 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1497 (D. Or. Sept. 21, 1989), 1989 WL
112802.
63 164 F.R.D. 475 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
2002]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAWREVIEW
promise deals in other cases. 64 The court denied discovery even
though the agreements were relevant, because the plaintiff had not
shown that she could not obtain the information through other means
such as interrogatories. 65 The court reasoned that confidential settle-
ment agreements should be protected where the relevant information
can be obtained by other means because "strong congressional policy
favoring settlement weighs in favor of keeping such documents pro-
tected, so long as the information is available through other means."6
Similarly, in Flynn v. Portland General Electric Corp.,67 age dis-
crimination plaintiffs requested discovery of the defendant company's
settlement agreement with a different age discrimination plaintiffa'
The defendant company motioned for a protective order against dis-
covery of the agreement, arguing that the plaintiffs had not shown any
need for the information "other than an impermissible desire to dis-
cover the terms of the ... settlement." 69 The plaintiffs argued that the
settlement agreement was relevant because both the settled case and
the action at bar involved reduction-in-force age discrimination
claims against the defendant. 70  The court granted the defendant's
protective order, holding that the plaintiffs had not shown sufficient
need for the information. 71 The court explained, "the strong public
policy favoring settlement of disputed claims dictates that confidenti-
ality agreements regarding such settlements not be lightly abrogated.
[The plaintiffs] have not identified specific information, other than
the settlement terms, which they seek from [the defendant] that could
not be secured by other discovery methods."72
Based on the above line of cases, if an Ohio party seeking to pre-
serve confidentiality of a settlement agreement can show that the in-
formation is available through other discovery means such as inter-
rogatories, he can argue that the settlement amount is not discover-
able.
5. Privacy Interest Versus Broad Discovery Interest
Some courts in determining if settlement agreements are discov-
erable, have noted that although both federal and Ohio procedural
rules allow for broad discovery, these liberal policies must be bal-
64 See id. at 476.
65 See id. at 477.
6 Id. at 476-77.
67 No. CIV.88-455-FR, 1989 WL 112802, at *1 (D. Or. Sept. 21, 1989).




72 Id. The court did not, however, identify how the plaintiff could otherwise obtain the
information.
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anced against the producing party's confidentiality and equity inter-
ests.73 While the privacy interest alone is insufficient to prevent dis-
covery of settlement agreements, some courts have held that where
the relevance of the settlement agreement is minimal, the privacy in-
terest weighs against discovery disclosure.74
In Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Housing Services,75 the plaintiff
sued her former employer, BankAmerica, alleging gender discrimina-
tion. She had previously settled another sex discrimination claim
against a different former employer, Trustco Bank.76 The plaintiff
motioned for a protective order prohibiting the discovery of the terms
of the confidential settlement agreement with Trustco Bank.7 7 She
argued that good cause 8 to protect the settlement terms from disclo-
sure existed because the agreement manifested the parties' express
intent to maintain confidentiality and provided penalties for breach.79
Additionally, Trustco Bank, the former defendant, argued that good
cause to prohibit disclosure existed because it bargained for confiden-
tiality in the agreement.80 BankAmerica argued the agreement was
relevant to impeach the witness's credibility.8' The court agreed with
the plaintiff and Trustco Bank that good cause existed and rejected
the credibility argument because "the fact of the settlement, without
going into details regarding the Agreement, would be sufficient to
impeach Hasbrouck's credibility."82
After it determined that good cause for the protective order ex-
isted, the court balanced the equities to determine the extent of
73 See, e.g., Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 660 N.E.2d 765
(Ohio Ct. Com. PI. 1993) (permitting discovery of settlement agreement after determining that
the relevancy outweighed the discovery burdens and noting "[t]he discovery rules embody com-
peting concerns. An effort to determine a discovery dispute must contain an assessment of the
potential for developing relevant evidence in addition to an analysis of the relative burdens the
discovery may entail.").
74 See Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Housing Servs., 187 F.R.D. 453, 454 (N.D.N.Y. 1999);
Hinshaw v. Superior Ct. of Santa Clara County, 51 Cal. App. 4th 233, 241-42 (Ct. App. 1996)
(holding that private settlement agreements are entitled to privacy protection such that privacy
should not be invaded absent a showing of compelling need); Hulse v. A.B. Dick Co., 162 Misc.
2d 263, 269 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (opining that "the strong public policy favoring settlement of
disputes dictates that confidentiality agreements regarding such [confidential] settlements not be
lightly abrogated.").
- 187 F.R.D. 453 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
76 See id. at 454.
77 See id. at 453-54.
78 The standard for granting a protective discovery order is as follows: "[For good cause
shown, the court may make 'any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense."' Id. at 455 (quoting Fed.
IL Civ. P. 26(c)).
79 See id. at 456.
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83protection needed. First, the court noted that the plaintiff and
Trustco Bank had a privacy interest in the settlement agreement.
84
The court elaborated that:
[The plaintiff] has an interest in maintaining the confi-
dentiality of the information as required by the Agreement,
so that she will not be in breach and subject to further liabil-
ity to Trustco Bank. Trustco Bank relies on the Agreement,
and the benefit of its bargain, to maintain the secrecy of its
confidential information .... Confidentiality is an important
corollary without which many lawsuits would remain unset-
tled. While protecting the confidentiality of settlement
agreements encourages settlements, which is in the public in-
terest, permitting disclosure would discourage settlements,
contrary to public interest. The public interest in maintaining
confidentiality of settlements is therefore strong.85
Additionally, the court acknowledged that there was a public pol-
icy interest, as evidenced by Federal Rule 408, in protecting the con-
fidentiality of settlement agreements because that protection encour-
aged settlements.86 The court also noted, however, the countervailing
public interest "in affording a litigant the opportunity to broadly dis-
cover information in support of its case.' '87 But the court then noted
that there was no constitutional right to access information necessary
to try a lawsuit. 88 The court concluded:
There is a strong public interest in encouraging settle-
ments and in promoting the efficient resolution of conflicts.
This strong public interest outweighs any general public in-
terest in providing litigants broad discovery of facts to sup-
port their claims and defenses. Finally, the minimal rele-
vance of the discovery sought illustrates the slight interest de-
fendants have in disclosure, particularly when the availability
of relevant evidence through other means is considered. The
balance of equities weighs in favor of protecting the terms of
the Agreement and the surrounding circumstances. 89
Finally, the court ordered that the settlement agreement be "given
the full amount of protection affordable under Rule 26(c)" because of
the plaintiff's "strong showing of good cause... the substantial public
83 See id. at 458.
8 See id.
85 Id. at 458-59.
86 See id. at 458-59.
87 Id. at 459.
88 See id.
89 Id. at 461.
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interest in maintaining confidentiality of settlements, and the slight, if
any, relevance demonstrated by BankAmerica." 90
In Hulse, plaintiffs sought a protective order against disclosure to
non-settling defendants of the terms of confidential settlement agree-
ments between plaintiffs and co-defendants. 91 The plaintiffs argued
that the confidentiality provision of the settlement agreement should
be upheld.92 The defendants argued that disclosure of the terms of the
settlement agreement was necessary for witness impeachment pur-
poses.93 The court rejected the impeachment argument in favor of the
privacy interest and granted the plaintiffs' protective order, reasoning
that:
Here, the compelling need for privacy articulated by the
plaintiffs outweighs the reasons stated by defendants for dis-
covery of the settlement agreements .... The settlement of
this case could not have been achieved without an agreement
that the terms of the settlement, particularly the consideration
paid, would not be revealed. Secrecy was deemed vital by all
of the parties to the agreements .... For the court to decline
to support the parties in their reliance upon the agreements
they have reached would work an inustice on these litigants
and would inhibit future settlements.
Based on the above cases, therefore, an Ohio litigant seeking to
protect a confidential settlement amount can argue that the confiden-
tiality provision was vital to the settlement and it can argue that it
bargained for the confidentiality provision. Finally, this party can
emphasize that the moving party will still have full discovery because
they can depose the settling party.
6. Policy Rationales
A litigant seeking to keep the settlement amount with a nonparty
secret can bolster its argument against discovery by emphasizing the
policy interests of Ohio Rule 408 and Federal Rule 408. As previ-
ously mentioned in Part I, although these rules do not directly govern
discovery, some courts have partly relied on Federal Rule 408 policy
in prohibiting discovery of settlement agreements.95 In Hasbrouck,
the court prohibited discovery of a confidential settlement agreement
90 Id. at461-62.
9' See Hulse v. A.B. Dick Co., 162 Misc. 2d 263, 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994).
92 See id.
93 See id. at 266.
94 Id. at 268-69.
95 See supra Part I notes 7-8.
2002]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
because the privacy and settlement policy interests outweighed the
relevance. 96 Regarding the Federal Rule 408 policy, the court stated:
Settlement of civil disputes is in the public interest because it
avoids the significant costs of trial. In addition to conserva-
tion of judicial and private resources, settlement results in
higher levels of satisfaction to the litigants, having deter-
mined their own solution to their dispute rather than being
subject to a judicially-created solution. Most importantly, a
settlement produces finality and repose upon which people
can order their affairs.
97
Similarly, the Bottaro court denied the defendant's motion to
compel discovery of a settlement agreement, reasoning that a particu-
larized showing of relevance was necessary for a settlement agree-
ment to be discoverable because of the "strong public policy of favor-
ing settlements and the congressional intent to further that policy
[through Federal Rule 408]."98
At least one court, however, has rejected this argument, opining
that the purpose of Federal Rule 408 applies only to settlement nego-
tiations and not to final settlements or discovery. 99 In Bennett, the
non-settling defendant hospital in a medical malpractice action mo-
tioned to compel discovery of a settlement agreement between the
plaintiffs, parents of a brain-damaged infant, and defendant physi-
cians.100 The court granted this motion, holding that the agreement
was relevant to damages and to determine the viability of the hospital
rejoining the physicians as third-party defendants.101 In doing so, the
Bennett court rejected the argument that the purpose of Federal Rule
408 to protect settlement communications from unnecessary intru-
sions extended to discovery. 102 Instead, the court opined that the fears
that would inhibit settlement offers in the absence of Federal Rule
408 did not apply to completed settlements because "[f]rom the point
of view of the settling parties, the deal is done."'1 3 Moreover, the
Bennett court opined that the Federal Rules' purpose to "secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action" weighed
96 See Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Housing Servs., 187 F.R.D. 453, 461-62 (N.D.N.Y.
1999).
97 Id. at 458 (citations omitted).
98 Bottaro v. Hatton Assocs., 96 F.R.D. 158, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
99 See Bennett v. LaPere, 112 F.R.D. 136, 139-40 (D.R.I. 1986).
100 See id. at 138.
101 See id. at 138-41.
102 See id. at 139.
103 Id. at 140.
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in favor of extending discovery to encompass settlement agree-
ments.'14
B. Admissibility of Confidential Settlement Agreement Amounts
Even if confidential settlement amounts are discoverable in Ohio,
are they admissible at trial? As discussed in Part I, under Ohio and
federal law, settlement evidence is admissible for purposes other than
to prove liability or validity of a claim. Therefore, under both Ohio
and federal law, admissibility of settlement evidence hinges upon the
purpose of admission. The following sections analyze possible ad-
mission arguments under both Ohio and federal law.
1. Ohio Rule 408 and Witness Bias
In Ohio, settlement evidence is admissible to show witness bias
and such admission does not violate Ohio Rule 408.105 Therefore, a
party seeking admission of the settlement amount, who plans to call
the settling party as a witness, may argue that the settlement amount
is admissible to impeach the settling party's testimony. But at least
one Ohio appellate court, in Shoemaker v. Cranford,1°6 has held that
settlement evidence offered for the permissible purpose of showing
witness bias under Ohio Rule 408 is nonetheless excludable under the
rule if the bias issue is not clear.1°7
In Shoemaker, a non-settling medical malpractice defendant ap-
pealed the trial court's exclusion of a settlement agreement between
the plaintiff and two co-defendants. 0 8 The settlement agreement
guaranteed the plaintiff a minimum payment in exchange for the
plaintiff's agreement not to proceed against the two defendants per-
sonally if the verdict exceeded the limits of their malpractice insur-
ance.1°9 The defendant argued that the agreement should have been
introduced to show the bias of the two settling co-defendants."0 The
appellate court, however, upheld the exclusion of the settlement be-
cause the bias issue was not clear."' The court reasoned "[t]he trial
court explored several scenarios where the agreement could actually
benefit appellant and harm the two settling doctors. Therefore, the
104 See U at 141 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1).
105 See VEISSENBERGER'S OHIO EVIDENCE §408.5 (2002). See also Shoemaker v. Craw-
ford, 603 N.E.2d 1114, 1118-19 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (noting that settlement evidence is gener-
ally admissible to show witness bias or prejudice).
M06 03 N.E.2d 1114 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
107 See i at 1118-19.
108 See id.at 1118.
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issue of bias was not clear ... As such, the trial court was justified
under either evidence rule 408 or 403 in excluding the evidence."
112
Based on this case, a party opposing admission of a confidential set-
tlement amount in Ohio may argue that the amount should be ex-
cluded from trial because the bias issue is unclear. Specifically, the
party could argue that disclosure of the agreement amount could harm
it because the jury will think that it would not have settled for that
cash amount unless it was liable. Or the opposing party could argue
that disclosure of the settlement amount would harm the plaintiff be-
cause the jury would think that the defendant must not be liable be-
cause the settlement cash amount was insubstantial.
2. Federal Rule 408 and Witness Bias
Federal courts have also refused to admit settlement evidence of-
fered for a permissible witness bias purpose under Federal Rule 408
where the admission would have the effect of proving liability." 3 In
Stacey v. Bangor Punta Corp.,1 4 the plaintiff motioned for a pretrial
order to exclude reference at trial to his settlement with a third-party
defendant." 5 The defendants argued that the settlement agreement
was admissible to show the bias and prejudice of the third-party de-
fendant.116  Although the court held that a pretrial ruling on the
admissibility of a settlement agreement would be premature, it noted
that:
[a]lthough Defendants claim to be offering the settlement for
purposes of impeachment or credibility determination, some-
times those issues are inextricably bound up with issues of
causation and liability and the offer runs afoul of Rule 408.
Moreover, it is only in light of evidence actually presented at
trial that the Court can determine relevance and balance that
against any prejudice or confusion that might be generated by
the factual aspects of the settlement.1
17
112 Id.
13 See Kennon v. Slipstreamer, Inc., 794 F.2d 1067, 1069-70 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding that
district court's disclosure of settlement agreement violated FRE 408 because it was used to
prove liability question); McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 247-49 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding
that settlement agreement improperly admitted because although the agreement was introduced
to attack the plaintiffs credibility, the effect of the admission was that the "impeachment" evi-
dence was camouflaged causation evidence); Stacey v. Bangor Punta Corp., 620 F. Supp. 636
(D. Me. 1985).
114 620 F. Supp. 636 (D. Me. 1985).
11 See id. at 637.
116 See id.
"7 Id. (citations omitted).
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In Kennon v. Slipstreamer, Inc.,u8 parents brought a product li-
ability action against multiple defendants, including a moped wind-
shield manufacturer, after their son was injured on a moped 1 9 Prior
to trial, the parents settled, for ten dollars each, their claims against all
of the co-defendants except the windshield manufacturer. 12° At trial,
the district court on its own initiative, disclosed the settlement amount
to the jury so that the jurors would not speculate as to the co-
defendants absence and whether the parents had received a substantial
payout. 121 The appellate court held that although the disclosure of the
fact of the settlement was proper to explain the absence of the settling
defendants, disclosure of the amount "violated Rule 408."122 The
court further noted that the disclosure of the amount prejudiced the
defendant because the settlement of the case for a nominal amount
suggested to the jury that the remaining non-settling defendant was
the only one liable in the case.'2 3 Specifically, the court stated that it
did "not attribute to the district court any intention that disclosure of
the settlement amount should be used by the jury to determine [de-
fendant's] liability or the amount of the claim. It is nonetheless clear
that [defendant] was prejudiced by that disclosure."' 24
Arguably, Kennon extends beyond nominal settlement amounts
and reaches all settlement amounts. This is because a party seeking
protection against admission at trial will usually be able to argue that
the jurors might view the settlement amount with the nonparty to be a
substantial amount that indicates the party's liability to the settling
nonparty and suggests that the party is also liable to the non-settling
party. Further, this party can argue that disclosure of the existence of
the settlement agreement and not the amount is sufficient to show
witness bias 25 Therefore, an Ohio litigant should be able to success-
fully argue that the settlement amount is inadmissible because its ef-
fect would be to show liability.
3. Rule 408 Policy Arguments
Similar to the discovery arguments, a party opposing disclosure
of its confidential settlement amount at trial can bolster is inadmissi-
bility arguments by making Rule 408 policy arguments. No Ohio
118 794 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1986).
19 Seeid. at 1068.
120 See id. at 1069.
121 See id.
122 Id. at 1070.
123 See id.
124 Id.
125 See Belton v. Fireboard Corp., 724 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that disclosure of
fact of settlement at trial did not violate Federal Rule 408 but disclosure of the amount did).
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court appears to have noted this policy yet. But some federal courts
have noted that admitting settlement agreements would violate the
congressional policy favoring- settlement by insulating potential liti-
gants from later being penalized in court for resolving their dispute
out of court. 126 Courts have been particularly apt to embrace this pol-
icy argument when there are two suits against a defendant involving
two different plaintiffs because of a concern of a chilling effect on
settlements and damaging inferences against the defendant.1 27
In Scaramuzzo v. Glenmore Distilleries Co.,I28 an age discrimina-
tion plaintiff sought to introduce evidence of the defendant's settle-
ment with other non-party employees in other age discrimination
suits.' 29 The defendant motioned the court to prevent the plaintiff
from introducing evidence about any charges, settlements, or settle-
ment terms about charges filed against the defendant by anyone other
than the plaintiff.130 The court granted this motion, reasoning that the
fact that persons other than the plaintiff had filed age discrimination
charges against the defendant was of minimal probative value in
comparison to the "potentially damaging inferences against [defen-
dant] that are not supported by the mere fact that a 'charge' had been
filed. ' 131 Likewise, an Ohio party opposing admission of a settlement
amount at trial can argue that the amount should be excluded because
admission would lead to the damaging inference that the defendant
would not have settled unless it was liable. This party can further
emphasize the chilling effect on settlements if confidential settlement
agreements are admissible.
4. Ohio Rule 403 & Federal Rule 403 Arguments Against
Admissibility
Even if an Ohio court found a confidential settlement amount to
be admissible under Ohio Rule 408, a party seeking to protect confi-
126 See McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 247 (1st Cir. 1985) (noting that the admis-
sion of settlement evidence would discourage settlements and thereby violate congressional
policy underlying Federal Rule 408); Scaramuzzo v. Glenmore Distilleries Co., 501 F. Supp.
727, 733 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (opining that "[ilt would be logically inconsistent to uphold the vitality
of Federal Rule 408, while at the same time holding that a settlement offer could be used against
the offeror in related cases").
127 See McHann v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 713 F.2d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1983) (opin-
ing that "the incentive for parties to settle cases involving many plaintiffs would be undermined
if their settlement with one victim could come back to haunt them in later suits"); Scaramuzzo,
501 F. Supp. at 733; Reichenbach v. Smith, 528 F.2d 1072, 1074 (5th Cir. 1976) (noting that
admission of settlement evidence "could work to discourage plaintiffs and defendants from
settling with one or more of several [litigants].").
128 501 F. Supp. 727 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
129 See id. at 732.
130 See id.
131 Id. at 733.
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dentiality can argue that the amount should be excluded under Ohio
Rule of Evidence 403 ("Ohio Rule 403"). 132 Ohio Rule 403 provides:
(A) Exclusion mandatory. Although relevant, evidence is not
admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues,
or of misleading the jury.
(B) Exclusion discretionary. Although relevant, evidence,
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by considerations of undue delay, or needless pres-
entation of cumulative evidence. 1
33
Further, the "trial court has broad discretion in the admission and
exclusion of evidence under Evid. R. 403."' 34
In Cannell v. Rhodes,135 the dispute centered on the admission of
settlement negotiation letters. 136 The court, in holding that the letters
were inadmissible under 408 because they were offered to prove li-
ability, also noted that under Rule 403, "itlheir prejudicial effect sub-
stantially outweighed any probative value, because the pernicious
effect of settlement evidence commonly misleads jurors to believe
that the offering party owed at least that amount.' 137 Therefore, Ohio
caselaw provides a party opposing admission of a confidential settle-
ment amount with a Rule 403 argument for exclusion. Specifically,
the amount should be excluded from the jury because of its substan-
tial prejudicial effect in that the jurors will think that the defendant is
liable and owed at least the amount of the settlement. This is espe-
cially true where the existence of the settlement alone can be used to
show bias because the probative value of the settlement amount is
very low.
Federal courts have also excluded settlement evidence under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 403 ("Federal Rule 403") that was otherwise
admissible under Federal Rule 408.138 Federal Rule 403 provides:
132 See Shoemaker v. Crawford, 603 N.E.2d 1114, 1119 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
although a settlement agreement was relevant to witness bias, its exclusion at trial was proper
under either Ohio Rule 408 or 403 because admitting the agreement would have caused jury
confusion); WEISSENBERGER'S OHIO EVIDENCE, supra note 105, at § 408.5 (noting that "pursu-
ant to the balancing principle of Rule 403, the trial judge may restrict the inquiry on cross-
examination in order to preserve the policy of Rule 408). See also Cannell v. Rhodes, 509
N.E.2d 963 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
133 OH. R. EviD. 403.
13 Shimola v. Cleveland, 625 N.E.2d 626,629-30 (Ohio Ct. App 1992).
135 509 N.E.2d 963 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
136 Id. at 967.
137 Id.
138 See, e.g., McHann v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 713 F.2d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1983).
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"[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is subsequently outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confu-
sion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of un-
due delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence." 139
In McHann v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,14° the plaintiff sued
multiple defendants, including a tire manufacturer and a service sta-
tion, for injuries he received when a tire exploded during mounting
activities at the service station. 141 The service station employee was
also injured in the explosion. 142 The plaintiff settled with the service
station and the trial court allowed the terms and amount of the settle-
ment agreement to be admitted at trial.143 The tire manufacturer de-
fendant did not settle with the plaintiff but did settle with the service
station employee.144 This settlement was not admitted at trial.1 45
On appeal, the court held that the district court erred in admitting
the settlement agreement between the plaintiff and service station. 146
The appellate court also affirmed the district court's exclusion of the
defendant's settlement with the service station employee. 47 Regard-
ing the agreement between the plaintiff and the service station, the
court held that the admission prejudiced the plaintiff because disclo-
sure of the amount could have led the jury to believe that the service
station would not have paid $27,000 if it were not liable. 148 Conse-
quently, the jury would not have believed that the remaining non-
settling defendant was liable. 149 The court further reasoned,
"[e]xcluding evidence of the [settlement] will eliminate this possible
source of prejudice."'1 50
The court also reasoned that the exclusion of the settlement be-
tween the defendant and the service station employee was proper be-
cause "[i]t is reasonable to infer that jurors would view the settlement
as an admission of guilt.' 5' Likewise, an Ohio party opposing ad-
mission of a settlement amount, can argue that admission of the set-
tlement amount will lead jurors to believe that the defendant would
not have paid the settlement amount unless it were liable.
'9 FED. R. EVID. 403.
140 713 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1983).
141 See id. at 162-63.
142 See id.
143 See id. at 163.
144 See id.
145 See id.
146 See id. at 166.
147 See id. at 167.
148 See id. at 166.
149 See id.
15o Id.
151 Id. at 167.
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m11. AN APPROACH THAT PROTECTS CONFIDENTIALITY
When Ohio courts are faced with the issue of whether a confiden-
tial settlement agreement amount between a defendant and a nonparty
is discoverable and admissible, they should follow the federal and
state jurisdiction approaches that zealously safeguard the secrecy of
such amounts. In particular, Ohio courts should only allow discovery
of such agreements where the moving party meets a heightened rele-
vancy standard and makes a "particularized showing" of relevance.
152
Further, Ohio courts should apply the Ohio Rule 403 balancing ap-
proach to admission of settlement amounts with a cognizance of the
substantial prejudice that disclosure of such amounts may cause to the
defendant.
Part I[I explains the application of these two approaches and why
they are justified in the context of confidential settlement agreement
amounts. Finally, this Part explores the implications of protecting
privacy interests and fostering settlements versus broad discovery
policies. Will this approach too narrowly limit the policy favoring
broad discovery? Does it unfairly ignore a litigant's interest in the
settlement amount as trial preparation and strategy?
A. Why the Heightened Relevancy Standard Should Be Used
This Comment suggests that Ohio courts should require a party
seeking discovery of confidential settlement amounts to make a "par-
ticularized showing" of relevance. This is because this approach will
best protect the litigant's privacy interest and foster settlements.
Moreover, this Comment rejects the argument that the broad discov-
ery policy, as evidenced in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, calls
for the normal, less stringent, relevancy policy to be used for several
reasons. First, the litigant's privacy intere~t and the policy favoring
settlements take priority. Arguably, defendants sued by multiple
plaintiffs would be less willing to settle cases with one or more of the
plaintiffs if there was a risk that that settlement agreement could harm
their position in a different case.153 Further, given the strained judi-
cial system and its clogged dockets, the policy favoring settlements
should be given priority because settlements help reduce the stress on
the courts. Also, the settling parties bargained for the secrecy. This
bargaining may have resulted in the defendant paying a higher settle-
ment amount or the plaintiff accepting a lower amount in exchange
152 See supra Part II.A.3 and accompanying text for discussion of this argument.
153 See, e.g., McHann v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 713 F.2d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1983)
(opining that "the incentive for parties to settle cases involving many plaintiffs would be un-
dermined if their settlement with one victim could come back to haunt them in later suits").
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for confidentiality. This bargain should be upheld by Ohio courts.
Using a heightened relevancy standard will help ensure that the bar-
gain is upheld by only allowing a party access to the confidential in-
formation if it has a compelling need and not allowing blanket access.
In turn, this also furthers the broad discovery process by ensuring that
a party with a compelling need for the settlement amount has discov-
ery access. Moreover, protection of the settlement amount will rarely
inhibit discovery. The moving party often will be able to obtain the
same relevant information sought from the settlement agreement
through deposition or interrogatories.154 Finally, to the extent that a
litigant seeks the settlement amount for impeachment purposes, the
existence of the settlement agreement alone is sufficient to impeach
witnesses. 
155
1. Policy Favoring Broad Discovery Interest Is Not Impermissibly
Limited by an Approach Favoring Privacy Interests
In determining both the discoverability and admissibility of con-
fidential settlement agreements, courts have struggled with the com-
peting policies of Civil Procedure Rule 26's emphasis on broad dis-
covery and Federal Rule 408's emphasis on fostering settlements.
1 56
Accordingly, the court's decision often hinges on which policy it fa-
vors. This Comment advocates that the policy favoring settlements
should take priority. First, as the court in Vardon Golf Co. v. BBMG
Golf Ltd.,57 countered in discussing the divergent approaches of Ben-
nett and Bottaro: "We believe that the Bottaro approach represents
the proper course. The policies underlying exclusionary evidentiary
rules have an equal if not stronger basis in our policy as the policies
favoring sweeping discovery."158 Moreover, protecting the confiden-
tiality of the settlement amount often does not inhibit discovery. The
moving party, as discussed in Part II, often has access to relevant in-
formation through other means such as deposition or interrogatories.
But preserving confidentiality also ensures the integrity of the adver-
sarial system, as well as the litigant's privacy interest. Further, this
Comment's approach does not completely bar a party from discovery
access. Instead, it only allows discovery for a party with a compel-
ling need for the amount. This approach, therefore, strikes a middle
ground between the competing privacy and discovery interests rather
than giving one interest complete dominance. Given the co-existence
154 See supra Part II.A.4 and accompanying text.
155 See supra Part II.A.1 and accompanying text.
156 See supra Part II notes 54-61 for a more detailed discussion.
157 156 F.R.D. 641 (E.D. Ill. 1994).
158 id. at 650.
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of the two rules, Evidence Rule 408 and Civil Procedure Rule 26, and
their conflicting policies, this middle ground approach is appropriate.
2. This Approach Does Not Unfairly Ignore Litigant's Interest in
Settlement Amount as Trial Preparation and Strategy
This Comment rejects the argument that disclosure of a confiden-
tial settlement amount is necessary to further a trial strategy and to
facilitate settlement.' 59 While current discovery rules do favor broad
discovery, this policy should not be extended to force litigants to hand
over their settlement amounts with nonparties to the plaintiff on a sil-
ver platter. The defendant bargained for this settlement amount and
may have agreed to a higher cash amount on the basis that the amount
would be kept secret. Arguably, if a defendant is forced to disclose
this amount to a different plaintiff in a different suit, the defendant's
bargaining was useless. This, in turn, could lead to a chilling effect
on settlements.
Also, even though current discovery rules advocate broad discov-
ery, ours is still an adversarial system. Allowing plaintiffs unfettered
access to a defendant's confidential settlement amount with a non-
party risks the integrity of the adversarial system by eroding it away.
3. Applying the Approach
Consider again the ABC Corp. hypothetical. ABC Corp. seeks to
prevent employee B from discovering and admitting ABC Corp.'s
settlement amount with employee A in a different lawsuit. If Ohio
courts use the heightened relevancy standard that this Comment pro-
poses, then employee B should not be able to discover the confiden-
tial settlement amount. Although employee B may plan to call em-
ployee A as a witness at trial and seeks to use the confidential settle-
ment amount to impeach employee A, the existence of the settlement,
alone, will achieve this. Further, the Ohio courts should reject the
trial strategy argument. Consequently, employee B is left to argue that
the settlement amount might lead to discoverable information. There-
fore, arguably, employee B cannot satisfy the particularized showing
of relevance standard and its discovery request should be denied. It is
important to note that by using this approach, Ohio courts would not
be unduly frustrating the broad discovery policy. This approach still
allows employee B the opportunity to obtain other relevant informa-
tion relating to the settlement agreement through deposition or inter-
rogatories. But this approach draws the line at allowing employee B
to invade ABC Corp.'s bargained for privacy interest.
159 See supra Part II.A.2 and accompanying texL
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Even if employee B met the heightened relevancy standard and
successfully discovered the confidential settlement amount, Ohio
courts should exclude the amount at trial under the Rule 403 balanc-
ing approach because of the substantial prejudice that admission
would cause ABC Corp. As discussed previously, the jury arguably
would either think that ABC Corp. is liable or else it would not have
paid the settlement amount. Or it might think that ABC Corp. is not
liable to employee B because it paid such a nominal amount to em-
ployee A. Either way, substantial prejudice to ABC Corp. or jury
confusion would result. Further, if employee B wants to use the set-
tlement amount to impeach witnesses, this goal can be achieved by
the mere fact of the settlement, without admitting the amount and
terms of the settlement. Therefore, Ohio courts should exclude the
confidential settlement amount. This would protect ABC Corp.'s pri-
vacy interest, foster settlement, and not unduly inhibit broad discov-
ery.
CONCLUSION
Ohio has not yet addressed the discoverability and admissibility
of a confidential settlement agreement amount. But other federal and
state jurisdictions have. Some of these jurisdictions emphasize the
litigant's privacy interest and the policy favoring settlements and
therefore require a heightened showing of relevancy. This Comment
suggests that Ohio courts should follow this approach because it
strikes the best balance between settlement policy and broad discov-
ery policy. In particular, this approach protects a litigant's privacy
interest, fosters settlement, accords with Ohio Rule of Evidence 408
policy, while also not unduly inhibiting broad discovery policies.
CHRISTINE M. TOMKO'
t Thank you to my family, including the Bulwark contingent, for your constant love,
support, patience, and faith in me. Most importantly, thank you James, my fiancd and love of
my life, for believing in me and challenging me to make the crowd go "aah." You have always
been my benchmark and inspiration.
[Vol. 52:833
